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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION





ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL AND HEALTH )
CARE CENTER, INC., )
Defendant. )
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL PURSUANT
TO RULE 12(b)(6)
Plaintiff, Seema Nayak (“Plaintiff”), is a former employee of the defendant, St. 
Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc. (“St. Vincent”). Following St. Vincent’s 
decision not to renew her residency contract, Plaintiff filed the present case against St. 
Vincent, alleging that St. Vincent discriminated against her on the basis of her national 
origin (Indian) and sex, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and her alleged disability, under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), as amended by ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”). Plaintiff also asserts claims for retaliation under 
Title VII and the ADA. St. Vincent moves to dismiss only Count IV, Plaintiff’s claim for 
disability discrimination. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in 
part, and DENIED in part.
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I. Factual Background
On July 7, 2007, Plaintiff matriculated into the Obstetrics and Gynecology 
(“OB/GYN”) residency program as a first-year resident at St. Vincent. (Complaint 1 21). 
The following year, she was promoted to second-year residency status. (Id. 1 22).
In March and April 2009, Plaintiff began to experience pregnancy-related issues, 
including morning sickness. (Id. 1 31). On May 15, 2009, Plaintiff was placed on 
complete bed rest. (Id. 1 33). While on bed rest, in August of 2009, one of Plaintiff’s 
unborn twins passed away. (Id. 1 34). Plaintiff delivered a baby on November 11, 2009, 
by caesarean section. (Id. 1 36).
As a result of Plaintiff’s pregnancy complications, she experienced post-partum 
difficulties, including symphysis pubis dysfunction, which required physical therapy 
before returning to work. (Id. 1 39). On the insistence of Plaintiff’s physician, St. 
Vincent’s OB/GYN Residency Program Director, Dr. Eric Strand (“Dr. Strand”), 
permitted Plaintiff to take an eight-week maternity leave. (Id. 1 40). On December 10, 
2009, Dr. Strand sent a letter to Plaintiff placing new conditions on her return to work. 
(Id. 1 41).
On December 28, 2009, Plaintiff returned to work and was immediately placed on 
a third-year residency rotation under the direction of Dr. Jody Freyre (“Dr. Freyre”), with 
whom Plaintiff had previous personal difficulties. (Id. 11 42, 43). On January 13, 2010, 
Dr. Freyre placed Plaintiff on probation. (Id. 1 44).
2
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On May 14, 2010, the Residency Education Committee decided unanimously not 
to renew Plaintiff’s residency contract. (Id. ^ 46). Plaintiff appealed the decision, and 
lost. (Id. H  52, 54).
On June 30, 2010, Dr. Strand sent the American Board of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology a letter indicating that the reason St. Vincent did not renew Plaintiff’s 
residency contract was “[d]ue to medically complicated pregnancy and significant 
concerns regarding her academic progress.” (Id. ^ 55 & Ex. 6).
I. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, “the 
complaint need only contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’” EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). Thus, the complaint must describe the claim in 
sufficient detail to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). 
In addition, the complaint’s “allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a 
right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level’” Id. (quoting Bell 
Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1965)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
3
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II. Discussion
The ADAAA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of 
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12102. A “physical or mental impairment” is defined by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in its interpreting regulations as “any physiological 
disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more 
body systems,” including the reproductive system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). For 
purposes of this motion, St. Vincent assumes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 
physical impairment. The issue presented is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 
pregnancy and post-pregnancy complications that substantially limited the major life 
activity of working. Plaintiff alleges discrimination under the actual disability prong of 
subsection (A) and discrimination under the “regarded as” prong of subsection (C). The 
court will begin with her case under subsection (A).
A. Disability Discrimination
In support of St. Vincent’s motion with respect to Plaintiff’s disability 
discrimination claim, St. Vincent cites the court to Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 
656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2012). There, the plaintiff suffered from pregnancy-related 
complications, prompting her doctor to order bed rest for twelve days, and to institute 
restrictions, including no heavy lifting or strenuous activities, for approximately four
4
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months. Id. at 545-46. These restrictions were removed by her doctor approximately four 
months before she gave birth. Id. at 547. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s 
pregnancy-related complications did not substantially limit her from performing the major 
life activity of reproduction because her complications did not last throughout her 
pregnancy nor extend beyond the time she gave birth. Id. at 555. The Court also found 
that her pregnancy-related complications did not substantially limit her from performing 
the major life activity of lifting because her lifting restriction was of limited duration and 
was not an abnormal condition of a pregnancy. Id.
The facts and controlling law in Serednyj differ from Plaintiff’s in two important 
respects. First, Serednyj was decided under the ADA, not the ADAAA. The interpreting 
regulations of the ADAAA specifically provide that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall 
be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by 
the terms of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). Moreover, according to these same 
regulations, “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer than six 
months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section.” Id. at § 
1630.2(j)(1)(ix). Second, Plaintiff’s pregnancy-related complications lasted far longer 
than the Serednyj plaintiff’s complications -  roughly eight months -  and they lasted 
beyond her pregnancy.
The two other district court decisions relied upon by St. Vincent also differ from 
the present case. In Sam-Sekur v. Witmore Group, Ltd., the district court dismissed the
5
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plaintiff’s ADAAA claim because she failed to allege any post-pregnancy physiological 
disorders related to her pregnancy. 2012 WL 2244325, at * 8-9 (E.D.N.Y. June 15,
2012). In the present case, Plaintiff alleged that she suffered from symphysis pubis 
dysfunction post-partum for approximately two months.
In Cooke v. Berkshire Farm Ctr. & Servs for Youth, the district court dismissed 
plaintiff’s ADA claim in part because she failed to alleged that her pregnancy-related 
complications had any long-term or permanent impact. 2012 WL 668612, at *5-6 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2012). This case, like Serednyj, was decided under the ADA, not the 
more lenient ADAAA. Given the lenient standard on a motion to dismiss, the current 
change in the law stating that an impairment lasting less than six months can be 
substantially limiting, and the present allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the court, in an 
abundance of caution, finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a plausible claim for disability 
discrimination under subsection (A).
B. Regarded As Disabled
St. Vincent argues that Plaintiff’s “regarded as” claim under subsection (C) fails 
for two reasons. First, Plaintiff’s pregnancy-related complications were transitory in 
nature. Second, Plaintiff’s perceived impairment(s) were not the “but-for” cause of St. 
Vincent’s decision not to renew Plaintiff’s residency contract.
The ADAAA specifically provides that “[p]aragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to 
impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an impairment with
6
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an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). As noted 
above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that her impairments lasted more than the six- 
months. Accordingly, this argument fails.
With respect to St. Vincent’s causation argument, St. Vincent cites the court to 
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., wherein the Seventh Circuit specifically held that 
a plaintiff must show “that her perceived disability was a but-for cause of her discharge.” 
591 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court noted that the ADA renders employers 
liable for employment decisions made “because of” a person’s disability. Id. at 962 
(citing the pre-amendment ADA). The Court further explained that “although section 
12117(a) (of the ADA) cross-references the remedies set forth in section 2000e- 
5(g)(2)(B) for mixed-motive cases, it does not cross-reference the provision of Title VII, 
section 2000e-2(m), which renders employers liable for mixed-motive employment 
decisions.” Id. In light of that fact, the Court concluded that an ADA plaintiff “must 
show that his or her employer would not have fired him but for his actual or perceived 
disability; proof of mixed-motive will not suffice.” Id.
Although, as Plaintiff observes, Serwatka was decided before the ADAAA went 
into effect, the court finds the reasoning set forth in Serwatka applies equally here. The 
only textual change that is relevant to this motion is the ADAAA’s general rule 
prohibiting employers from making employment-related decisions “on the basis of” (as 
opposed to “because of”) an employee’s disability. This small change in the text of the
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ADAAA is not significant enough to transform the ADAAA into a mixed-motive statute. 
The court therefore finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a plausible claim for relief 
under the “regarded as” prong of subsection (C).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part,
St. Vincent’s Motion for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Docket # 16). 
Specifically, St. Vincent’s motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s “regarded as” 
claim, and DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s actual disability claim.
SO ORDERED this 9th day of January 2013.
Southern District of Indiana
Distributed Electronically to Registered Counsel of Record.
United States District Court
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